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The determinants of privatization prices:
evidence from Turkey
KERIM PEREN ARIN and CAGLA OKTEN*z
Department of Commerce, Massey University, Auckland, New Zealand and
zDepartment of Economics, Bilkent University, Bilkent, Ankara 06800 Turkey
This paper analyses the determinants of privatization prices in a multi-industry study
using a sample of 68 recently privatized firms from Turkey. Results show that
revenue and market characteristics are significant determinants of privatization
prices while current cost and profit indicators are not. It is argued that potential
buyers regard these state firms as inefficient, therefore do not take into consideration
their current costs and profits in determining their value. When the dependent
variable is altered by dividing the firm’s privatization price by the firm’s sales
(revenues), it is found that sales-adjusted privatization prices are responsive to
firms’ profit margins. However, this result does not hold when the sample is
restricted to a single industry. Profit margins along with other profitability and
firm efficiency measures are no longer significant determinants of sales-adjusted
privatization prices in the cement industry analysis. Unexploited production oppor-
tunities measured by capacity utilization ratios, and complete private ownership
resume a more important role.
I . INTRODUCTION
Generating revenue is one of the fundamental objectives of
privatization. Yet, very little is known about how well one
achieves this objective and what determines privatization
revenues. How do firm and market characteristics affect
privatization prices? Should government adopt restructur-
ing investments prior to privatization? Is there a learning
effect in the privatization process?
This paper uses firm-level data to answer these important
questions and analyse the determinants of privatization
prices in Turkey. The effects of firm, market and auction
characteristics on privatization prices are measured using a
sample of 68 firms from six different industries, namely
cement, dairy products, ports, marinas, airport services
and the heavy manufacturing industry.
The study focuses next on a single industry, the cement
industry, and analyses the determinants of privatization
prices for the 24 privatized cement plants for several rea-
sons. First, inter-industry studies may suffer from problems
associated with unobserved heterogeneity at the industry
level, and the analysis of a single sector is useful to check
the robustness of results. Second, all public cement plants
that ever existed were privatized between 1989 and 1998
and the sample includes all of these plants. Therefore,
one is able to look at a more complete picture of privatiza-
tion and avoid the problem of endogeneity associated with
sample selection. Third, a more detailed analysis of the
determinants of privatization prices is possible due to
increased data availability for this industry. Fourth, Tur-
key is the largest cement producer in Europe and seventh in
the world (OAIB, Cimento Sektoru Raporu, 1998).
Privatization in Turkey started around 15 years ago, in
order to relieve the state from the burdens of inefficient state
industries and create revenue for the government. Since
then, numerous state companies have been sold to the
private sector. Most of the privatizations in the sample were
realized through block sales – closed bid auctions – and
through a combination of block sales and public offerings
in a few cases.
Privatization has received considerable attention in
recent years. Megginson and Netter (2001) provide an
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excellent survey paper of the privatization literature. A
major portion of this literature focuses on changes in
firms’ efficiency as a result of privatization. Literature on
the determinants of privatization prices is relatively sparse.
A branch of the finance literature concentrates on the
under-pricing of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) of public
enterprises. For instance, a recent study by Huang and
Levich (1998) finds that initial returns on privatization
IPOs are significantly less than seasoned offerings.
To the authors’ knowledge, there is only one other
empirical study that analyses the effects of firm character-
istics and auction process variables on privatization prices.
Lopez-De-Silanes (1997) examines 236 Mexican firms,
which were privatized between the years 1983 and 1992.
This study used a very heterogeneous sample of firms
from many different industries. It is possible that unob-
served industry heterogeneity might have influenced
results. Since there are data for a sizeable number of
firms from a single industry one will be able to analyse
whether the results are applicable when this industry is
focused on and problems associated with unobserved het-
erogeneity at the industry level are avoided.
It is found that the number of bidders increases priva-
tization prices by increasing the level of competition in
these auctions as Lopez-De-Silanes (1997) finds. However,
there are notable differences on how firm characteristics
affect privatization prices. While his findings indicate that
low profitability of state-owned prices explain the low price
paid, it is found that revenues affect privatization prices,
not profits. The reason is straightforward: what fundamen-
tally determines the privatization price is the expected
future profit of the firm. Potential buyers discount firms’
current costs since they believe that these firms are ineffi-
cient. Current costs and hence profits do not affect priva-
tization prices because they do not reflect expected future
profits, whereas revenue and market characteristics are
good indicators for future profitability.
When the dependent variable is altered by scaling the
raw privatization price with the firm’s sales (revenues) it
is found that firm’s profit margin has a positive and sig-
nificant effect on the sales adjusted privatization price simi-
lar to Lopez-De-Silanes. However, when a single industry
(cement industry) is concentrated on, this variable is no
longer found to be significant. Therefore, the interpretation
for the effect of this variable is different from Lopez-De-
Silanes. One would argue that profit margins measure the
differences in market power of firms in different industries
(market structures) rather than differences in firm efficiency
and that is why profit margins are significant in the multi-
industry study and insignificant in the single (cement)
industry analysis.
In the focus on the cement industry it is found that
unexploited production opportunities measured by a low
capacity utilization ratio and complete private ownership
become significant determinants of the sales-adjusted pri-
vatization price.
Restructuring investment is initially found to have a
negative effect on the sale price. However, when the num-
ber of bidders is included in the regression, restructuring
investment is no longer significant. It is argued that restruc-
turing investment might be measuring for the number of
bidders in the absence of this control. In other words, firms
that are expected to attract few buyers undergo restructur-
ing to increase their prospects.
The following section describes the institutional back-
ground of privatization in Turkey in general and of the
cement industry in particular. Section III explains the
theoretical framework of the analysis. Section IV presents
the data and the methodology used. The econometric
results are presented and discussed in Section V. Section
VI offers concluding thoughts and directions for future
research.
II . INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Privatization in Turkey
Historically, Turkey has had a long experience relying heav-
ily on state owned enterprises (SOEs). SOEs were estab-
lished during the 1930s by the government to jump-start
the economy that collapsed with the end of the Ottoman
era in 1923. Over the years SOEs grew enormously, leaving
the control of a large section of the economy to bureaucrats
and politicians. Politicians exploited SOEs to provide jobs
to their constituents at the expense of consumers, who were
faced with higher prices. Consequently, in the 1980s, SOEs
began to be perceived negatively due to poor financial per-
formance, overstaffing, dependence on subsidies, protected
markets and corruption (Ficici, 2001).
After a Military Regime (1980–1983), the first party that
came to power under the leadership of Prime Minister
Turgut Ozal was the Motherland Party (ANAP). Ozal
was heavily influence by Margaret Thatcher’s policies
that promoted reducing the state’s role in the economy.
Privatization came into the political agenda first with
Ozal’s trade and capital account liberalization programme
in 1984.
Despite this initial enthusiasm, however, Turkey realized
only a small portion of its privatization potential.
Privatization of state owned enterprises has so far been
concentrated in a few industries. Between 1986 and 1998
only $4.5 billion worth of assets, representing less than
10% of the outstanding state owned assets could be
divested (Ficici, 2001). The privatization reforms have
not been fully carried out as intended, due to a lack of
legal framework and conflicting laws in the country’s
constitution with regard to privatization.
































Privatization process in the cement industry
The first cement plant in Turkey was established in 1911 by
a private firm. By 1950, four new private plants had been
built. Only after 1950 did the cement industry develop on a
large scale by means of a government initiative. A public
enterprise, CISAN (Turkish acronym for Turkish Cement
Industry Co. later named CITOSAN), was established in
1953 to build 15 plants in various regions. Before privati-
zation of the cement plants started in 1989, the public share
in the cement industry was nearly 40% (Saygili and
Taymaz, 2000). It is believed that each company was able
to exercise some monopoly power within its hinterland
(Ertuna, 1998), most probably due to the distance between
firms and the lack of proper transportation facilities in the
public sector.
In 1986, A French company, Sema-Metra Conceil was
contracted by the Turkish government and the World Bank
to prepare two reports, one on the structural Regulation of
the Cement Sector and Privatization and the other on the
plan for the Reorganization of CITOSAN. In the latter
report, Sema-Metra Conceil suggested that plants in the
West be privatized first since they could be as profitable
as private plants, and recommended that the eastern plants
be restructured prior to privatization. The report also sug-
gested privatization on a plant-by-plant basis, as the sale of
the state firm as a single entity, may have led to an
unhealthy monopoly (Tallant, 1993). In 1986, there was a
major change in the economic environment of the cement
plants. Prior to 1986, the Turkish Cement Producers’
Association (TCPA) set prices and market areas for
all cement companies, however, after 1986 firms were
encouraged to operate independently and maximize profits.
Sema-Metra’s first report might partially have led to this
change.
Privatization in the cement industry started in 1989, with
the initial sale of five factories to the French firm Cement
Francais (SCF). By 1998, the sale of 24 public firms
was completed. The recommendations of the Sema-Metra
report were taken into consideration, and the western
plants were privatized first, with two exceptions, Denizli
and Lalapasa. These two public firms were established in
1987 and 1991 respectively, in order to meet the growing
demand in the western regions. It may also be the case that
the privatization of the eastern plants were delayed, as the
eastern region suffered from unemployment and terrorism
throughout the 1990s, and public enterprises were used as a
means of employment.
Privatization of the cement plants was carried out under
the Privatization Administration of Turkey. Most of the
privatizations were realized through block sales – closed-
bid auctions – and through a combination of block
sales and public offerings in a few cases. Public sector
employment was guaranteed to all workers that lost their
jobs because of privatization (Privatization in Turkey,
Ozellestirme Idaresi Baskanligi). Hence there was no dis-
posal cost of workers for the buyers of the privatized firms.
Today, the Turkish cement industry consists of 39 pri-
vate plants, some owned by giant industrial holdings and
others by small one-plant companies. There are four for-
eign investors in the industry, namely French firms Ciment
Francais, Lafarge Coppee, Ciment Vicat and German
Heidelberger Zement/CBR. Cement consumption con-
tinues to grow at sound levels and Turkey continues to
be a major exporter of cement. According to the report
of Central Anatolian Board of Export, in 1998, Turkey
was the largest cement producer in Europe and seventh
in the world. (OAIB, Cimento Sektoru Raporu).
III . THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This study sets out to explain two variables. The first one is
the raw privatization price and the second one is the sales
and share adjusted privatization price, which is constructed
by scaling the raw privatization price by the firm’s revenues
and percentage of shares privatized.
Determinants of raw privatization prices
Assuming that auctions are competitive and there is no
significant corruption, one would expect privatization
prices to reflect expected future profits. Current profits
will have a positive effect on the privatization price to the
extent that they reflect future profits. If state owned firms
are inefficient because they employ excess labour, misuse
their resources or simply over-inflate their budgets, one
does not necessarily expect current profits to reflect
expected future profits as current costs will not reflect
future costs.
Firm and industry characteristics
If state owned firms are inefficient, current revenue and
market characteristics might have more valuable informa-
tion than current costs in reflecting future profits. Hence,
we expect sales, production level and growth rate to have
positive effects on privatization prices as they measure for
the market size and potential available to these firms.
Expected costs will depend on expected labour costs and
future investment. If state owned firms employ excess
labour and there are costs to firing workers due to strong
unions, etc., one would expect number of workers to
decrease the privatization price. If there are no disposal
costs of excess labour on the other hand, current number
of workers is not likely to have any effect. In the case of the
cement and dairy industries, the Turkish government guar-
anteed public sector employment to all workers who lost
their jobs as a result of privatization, and hence there was
no displacement cost of labour for the new owner for the
































majority of firms in the sample. Hence one does not expect
the number of workers to have any effect on the privatiza-
tion price for these industries.
Capacity utilization ratio might be a good candidate
measure of the firm’s expected future investment. This
ratio is the percentage of the optimal capacity utilized in
the production process and optimal capacity is the mini-
mum efficient scale. A high value of this variable indicates
that increases in production in the near future are likely to
start increasing the average costs and therefore the firm will
need to invest in capacity. Hence, if the market has a strong
growth potential, then the capacity utilization ratio is
expected to have a negative effect on price. Firms may
also value a low capacity utilization rate because they
value excess capacity to deter entry or to respond to fluc-
tuations in demand. If the market is not expected to grow
and current production is a good indicator of future pro-
duction, however, then a high capacity utilization rate is
better as average costs fall as the firm increases its capacity
towards the minimum efficient scale. Hence a priori, the
effect of capacity utilization rate on privatization prices
depends on whether firms plan to increase production in
the near future.
Auction process variables
The level of competition in auctions is expected to affect
the privatization price (Milgrom, 1987; Laffont, 1994). The
auction theory states that the sale price should increase as
the number of bidders increases since this would increase
the level of competition. Therefore, we expect privatization
price to be an increasing function of the number of bidders
that participate in the auction.
The effect of the length of the auction on the sale price is
not that clear. It may have a negative effect on sale price if
the announcement of privatization triggers deterioration of
incentives and performance, similar to that of firms in
financial distress (Altman, 1984; Wruck, 1990). If the
announcement of privatization increases public’s attention
on the firm’s performance, however, then the firm’s
managers might increase their efforts to acquire a good
reputation (Caves, 1990).
Government decisions
It is important to assess what the role of government
should be in the privatization process. On one hand,
government may increase the privatization price of the
firm by adopting restructuring policies prior to the priva-
tization. On the other hand, the existence of restructuring
policies may signal the low productivity or the backward
technology of the firm, and decrease the privatization price.
Government also decides on the amount of shares that
are privatized. One expects the percentage of the firm that
is privatized to have a positive effect on the raw privatiza-
tion price. The percentage of the privatization ranges from
40 to 100% in the complete data set and 95.6 to 100% for
the cement industry sample. The importance of complete
ownership on the sales and share adjusted privatization
price is also tested by constructing a dummy variable,
which is equal to one if the firm were privatized in totality.
Finally, there can be a learning process for the govern-
ment during the privatization process. If there exists a
learning effect, the inflation corrected sale value of the
firms privatized later should be higher than those that
were privatized earlier. However, according to Sema-
Metra Conceil’s report, more profitable/valuable plants in
western regions were privatized first. If this is the case,
firms that are privatized later may fetch a lower price.
Determinants of sales and share adjusted privatization
prices
Using the sales and share adjusted privatization price as the
dependent variable allows one to focus on the effects of
firm profitability and efficiency variables in determining
privatization prices once firms’ revenue characteristics are
accounted for. In other words, the goal is to analyse what
determines privatization prices once one accounts for firm’s
‘value’ approximated by the firm’s sales. In addition to
firm’s profits, the effects of the firm’s profit margin and
labour productivity are measured in determining the sales
adjusted privatization price. Profit margin, constructed by
dividing profits by the firm’s revenues, may be interpreted
as a measure of market power or firm efficiency. In fact, in
a constant cost industry, assuming that all costs are vari-
able in the long run, it is the measure of a firm’s ability to
charge a price above marginal cost. To the extent that state
owned firms maximize an objective function, which puts
some weight on the firms’ profits, state owned firms’ cur-
rent profit margins will reflect future profit margins and
hence influence the privatization price.
Labour productivity is a measure of firm efficiency in the
analysis of the cement industry since unit of output is con-
stant across firms. To the extent that current firm efficiency
will reflect future firm efficiency, we would expect labour
productivity to have a positive influence on the sales
adjusted privatization price.
The expected effects of auction process variables and
government decisions such as restructuring investment,
the number of bidders, length of auction, time of privatiza-
tion on the sales adjusted privatization prices are same as
discussed above.
IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Our data set of 68 firms is constructed by using the official
statistics of the Privatization Administration of Turkey,
and includes 24 cement factories, 29 dairy product plants,
































four ports, three marinas, two airline service firms, and
six heavy industry manufacturers like mining and metal
firms, which were privatized in Turkey between the
years 1989 and 1998. Sample size is reduced in certain
specifications as one lacks data on profits for some of
these firms.
The Privatization High Council is the ultimate decision-
making body for privatization, under the chairmanship of
the Prime Minister. Sales of public companies are through
domestic or international offerings, block sales to persons
and/or entities, block sales including deferred public offer-
ings, sales to employees, sales on the stock exchange by
standard and special offers, and finally sales to securities
investment funds and/or securities investment partnerships
by taking into consideration the prevailing conditions
of the companies (Privatization in Turkey, Ozellestirme
Idaresi Baskanligi). In the sample, 65 out of 68 firms
were sold through block sales. The remaining three firms
were sold through a combination of block sale and public
offerings.
In the first set of regressions, the dependent variable is
the raw privatization price of the firm, corrected for infla-
tion using the official CPI statistics of Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis taking 1987 as the base year.
In the second set of regressions, the determinants of
privatization prices given the firms’ sales are analysed
by using the sales (and share) adjusted privatization
price as the dependent variable. This sales-adjusted priva-
tization price is obtained by dividing the standardized sale
price by the total sales (revenues) of the firm in the year
prior to privatization and by the percentage of shares
privatized.
The goal in this set of regressions is to explore whether
differences in firm efficiencies and market power measured
by the level of profit, labour productivity and profit mar-
gins, are reflected in the privatization price given the ‘value’
of the firm approximated by its sales.
The description of the independent variables and their
expected effects on privatization prices are presented in
Table 1. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for all vari-
ables of interest, for the complete sample. Table 3 repre-
sents the summary statistics for the cement industry
sample. Regressions are estimated using an Ordinary
Least Squares method in all regressions except one,
where government’s restructuring investment is instrumen-
ted with lagged values of this variable in a two-stage
least squares estimation. Standard errors are White (1980)
corrected.
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Results for the complete sample are presented in Table 4A
where the dependent variable is the inflation-adjusted
privatization price. The findings show that the main
determinant of the privatization prices is the amount of
sales before privatization. The amount of sales has a
positive and a significant effect on the privatization price
(Regressions 1 through 3), while net profits (Regression 3),
capacity utilization ratio and number of workers are found
to be insignificant (Regression 1). The number of workers
does not have a significant effect because the Turkish gov-
ernment guaranteed public sector employment to all work-
ers who lost their jobs as a result of privatization in the
dairy and cement industries, and hence there was no dis-
placement cost of labour for the new owner for the vast
majority of firms in the sample.
These results indicate that the buyer cares about the
firm’s revenues and not its profits. It is believed that current
costs and profits do not reflect expected future profits
because buyers view state owned firms as inefficient.1
There seems to be a considerable amount of industry
heterogeneity in our sample. The dummy variable is
found to be negative and significant (Regression 1) for the
dairy industry and positive and significant for marinas
(Regressions 2 and 3). It is not found that privatization
year has any significant effects on the raw privatization
price (Regression 2).
Next, using the same dependent variable, the cement
industry is focused on in order to (1) avoid the problems
associated with unobserved heterogeneity at the industry
level, (2) conduct a more through analysis as we have
data available for a wider range of variables, and (3)
avoid the problem of endogeneity associated with sample
selection since all public cement plants were privatized and
we have data for all of them.
Regression results for the cement industry are presented
in Table 4B. Results show that proportion of the firm pri-
vatized, production level, production growth rate have
positive and significant effects on privatization price,
while net profits and number of workers are found to be
insignificant (Regressions 1 and 2). Production level mea-
sures the size of the market available for these regional
monopolies, while growth rate of production indicates
the growth potential of this market.2
Although the proportion of the firm privatized has a
narrow range – between 95.6 and 100% – it still turns
out to be an important determinant of sale value indicating
the importance of complete private ownership.
1Okten and Arin (2002) find that cement firms that are analysed in this paper, decrease their number of workers significantly after
privatization indicating the existence of excess labour in the public sector.
2Other variables such as capacity and sales were also used instead of firm’s output to measure for the market size available to the firm.
Results essentially remained the same.
































It is found that the capacity utilization ratio has a nega-
tive and significant effect on the privatization price, in con-
trast to the inter-industry study where this variable was not
found to be significant. This result is intriguing and there
can be several reasons why potential buyers would value a
low utilization rate as discussed in the theoretical frame-
work section. One possible explanation for this finding is
that capacity utilization ratio might be correlated with the
growth rate of the market. Government might have con-
sidered this growth rate when it made the capacity choice
for these firms. For example, if a market had a high
expected growth rate, government might have initially
chosen a high capacity level and therefore a low capacity
utilization ratio for the cement plant.
In order to address this possibility, the population
growth rate of the city where the cement factory is located
is included in the regression as well as the growth rate of
production (Regression 3). Population growth rate of the
city measures for the expected growth potential of the mar-
ket, and has a positive though insignificant effect on priva-
tization price. It is interesting to note that capacity
utilization ratio is no longer significant in this regression
supporting the argument that a high utilization ratio is
more prevalent for markets with low growth potential.3
It is found that the privatization year has an insignificant
effect on sale price (Regression 3). This result does not
support the learning argument, however, if privatization
year is endogenous to the expected privatization price, in
other words if firms that are easier to sell or more likely to
fetch a high price are privatized first, then one would expect
lower prices for later privatizations. Indeed, Sema-Metra
Conseil Report suggested that more profitable western
3Capacity utilization ratio is negatively correlated with population growth rate at 10% significance level, further strengthening
this argument.




Panel A: Firm and industry characteristics
Production The production level, one year before the privatization,
measured in tons
Positive
Sales The sales (revenue) amount one year before privatization,
measured in dollars
Positive
Capacity utilization ratio The percentage of optimal capacity that is utilized, one year
before privatization
Ambiguous
Number of workers The number of employees one year before the privatization Insignificant
Net profit The net profits of the firm in dollars, one year before the
privatization, corrected for inflation
Positive or
Insignificant
Profit margin Net profits of the firm, one year before privatization,
corrected for inflation
Positive
Labour productivity The output of the firm (in tons) divided by the number of employees,
one year before privatization
Positive
Per capita sales The amount of sales (in dollars) divided by the number of employees,
one year before privatization
Positive
Production growth rate The five-year arithmetic average of production growth before privatization Positive
Population growth rate The population growth rate of the city in which the cement factory
has been located, between the years 1990–1997
Positive
Panel B: Auction process variables
Number of bidders The number of bidders admitted to join the final auction by government Positive
The length of auction The number of days between the first public announcement of privatization
and the completion of the sale.
Ambiguous
Panel C: Government decisions
Percentage privatized The percentage share of the firm that is sold to the private sector Positive
Complete ownership dummy ¼1 if 100% of the firm is privatized Positive
Restructuring investment Restructuring investment by the government in dollars, one year before the
privatization, corrected for inflation
Ambiguous
Privatization year The year that the public firm was sold to the private sector Ambiguous
yAll values are corrected for US inflation by using the official CPI statistics of Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. 1987¼ 1.00 is used
as a base year. Turkish Lira Values are transformed into Dollar values by using Lira/Dollar exchange rate based on bid prices of Turkish
Central Bank.
































plants be privatized first and this suggestion was mostly
followed. Hence an insignificant coefficient on the privati-
zation year may actually indicate that there is a learning
effect if more profitable firms located in vibrant western
markets were sold first and all else equal, these firms
would have fetched a higher price.
The restructuring investment by the government prior
to privatization appears to have a negative effect on the
privatization price (Regression 4). This result supports
Lopez-De-Silanes (1997), who finds that the direct costs
of prior restructuring policies absorb the sale price.
Lopez-De-Silanes (1997) argues that this is due to the
fact that restructuring measures cause delays in privatiza-
tion. However, there can also be an endogeneity problem
with this finding. If firms that are more difficult to privatize
are subject to more restructuring measures then one would
also find a negative relationship between sale price and
restructuring investment. In order to address this possible
endogeneity problem, we use a two-stage least squares
method and instrument restructuring investment with
investment undertaken two years prior to the privatization
year and other explanatory variables. Results essentially
remain the same (Regression 5).
When we include the number of bidders as well as the
restructuring investment in the regression however, restruc-
turing investment becomes positive though not significant
(Regression 6). The change in the significance of restructur-
ing investment when number of bidders is included in the
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the complete sample
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Privatization Price 68 143108.3 179182.6 739.8294 802358.3
Sales Adjusted Privatization Price 66 4.266444 7.202772 0.2287631 34.71449
Proportion Privatized 68 98.03453 8.597328 40 100
Total Privatization Dummy 68 0.7352941 0.4444566 0 1
Production 53 173296.7 208726.3 124 727602
Capacity Utilization Ratio 62 59.33871 39.29653 1.66 179.91
Number of Employees 68 218.0588 332.0999 4 2053
Labour Productivity 24 1315.958 497.2238 792 2917
Dairy Products Dummy 68 0.4264706 0.498241 0 1
Ports Dummy 68 0.1029412 0.3061414 0 1
Cement Dummy 68 0.3529412 0.4814377 0 1
Services Dummy 68 0.0294118 0.1702139 0 1
Sales 68 60809.66 76154.29 0 282258.1
Profits 38 8797.14 36216.3 38898.79 168980.4
Number of Bidders 18 2.944444 2.838231 1 10
Privatization Year 68 1994.588 2.319517 1989 1998
Labour Productivity 53 661.1842 691.0316 12.4 2916.739
Restructuring Investment 24 5763.705 8001.413 0 29527.59
Sales per Capita 68 298.4054 239.7006 0 1329.29
Profit Margin 38 0.015258 0.7852719 3.239727 2.720792
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the cement industry
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Privatization Price 24 265.0156 162.8225 22.3072 802.3583
Sales Adjusted Privatization Price 23 2.200449 1.310716 0.7150006 6.660847
Proportion privatized 24 99.63583 .962695 95.46 100
Sale Value 24 27273.19 17073.34 2230.72 80235.81
Labour Productivity 24 374806.9 143875 102000 727602
Capacity Utilization Ratio 24 79.16667 15.67514 50 109
Employment 24 291.5417 75.73924 72 408
Production growth rate 24 .116893 .2650098 .0134552 1.288491
Restructuring Investment 24 5763.71 8001.41 0 29527.59
Profit 24 804429.2 2370783 6127637 5429272
Number of Bidders 18 2.944444 2.838231 1 10
Auction Length 19 266.3158 169.5465 58 478
Population Growth Rate 24 7.897083 14.33121 13.49 39.4
Privatization Year 24 1992.958 2.773777 1989 1998
Profit Margin 24 0.0846934 0.2785005 0.2762347 1.258642
































regression is troubling. There can be two reasons for this
change: (1) the relationship between sales price and restruc-
turing investment is not robust and a reduction of sample
size due to lack of data on the number of bidders for six
firms, is enough to make investment insignificant; (2) rela-
tionship between privatization price and restructuring
investment is endogenous, government undertakes this
investment only for firms that are expected to attract few
potential buyers.
We believe there is some truth in both explanations. We
re-did regression 6 excluding the number of bidders but
restricting the regression to those observations for which
this variable is available. Restructuring investment is posi-
tive but very insignificant in this regression, which is avail-
able upon request. We also contacted buyers of these state
firms, of which two responded. One buyer who actually
bought two of the plants indicated that government
restructuring investment was not significant and did not
affect their bids. This buyer also indicated that market
size of the firm was the most important determinant of
their valuation, providing further support for the results
on the importance of market characteristics. The second
buyer indicated that they regarded government’s restruc-
turing investment as a sign for the backward technology of
the firm, supporting the argument that government’s
investment is endogenous to the value and hence the sale
price of the firm.
It is found that the number of bidders has a positive and
significant effect on the sale price as implied by economic
theory. Auction length on the other hand, is not a signifi-
cant determinant of privatization prices.
Regressions presented in Table 4A and 4B provide evi-
dence that potential buyers value revenue characteristics in
pricing public firms instead of cost or profit characteristics.
However to understand the privatization process better,
one has to understand what determines the privatization
price given the firm’s revenues. This question is addressed
by altering the dependent variable of the first set of regres-
sions such that the new dependent variable is the sales-
adjusted privatization price constructed by dividing the
raw privatization price by the firm’s sales and percentage
of shares privatized. In this set of regressions attention is
focused on how efficiency and market power measures like
profits and profit margin (profit over sales) affect the sales-
adjusted privatization price as well as the effect of complete
ownership. Complete ownership will be an important fac-
tor of the new owner’s freedom in choosing its pricing
policies and therefore its ability to take advantage of any
market power that the firm might have.
Results for the complete sample are presented in Table
5A. The most striking result from the inter-industry study
is that the differences in profit margins across firms stand
out as an important determinant of the sales adjusted pri-
vatization prices (Regression 1). This result is consistent
with that of Lopez-De-Silanes. To the extent that a state
owned firm places a positive weight on its profits in its
objective function, the current profit margin will be an
indicator of the firm’s potential market power and hence
its ability to have a mark up over marginal cost once pri-
vatization takes place. Level of the firm’s profits on the
other hand is insignificant as before.
Capacity utilization rate is insignificant in Table 5A
regressions while the privatization year is positive and sig-
nificant indicating that there might be learning by govern-
ment in the privatization process.
When we focus on a single industry – the cement indus-
try – in Table 5B regressions, the efficiency and profitability
measures are not found to be significant determinants of
the sales-adjusted privatization prices. It is interesting to
note that profit margin is no longer a significant determi-
nant of the sales-adjusted privatization price though it was
found to be significant in the multi-industry sample.
Neither the profit margin (Regression 1) nor the level of
Table 4A. Determinants of privatization pricesy: Complete sample.
Dependent variable: Privatization Price
(1) (2) (3)
Proportion 3.956 10.658*** 7.212**
Privatized (0.85) (3.41) (2.59)






Cement Dummy 66.169 60.301 15.874
(0.58) (0.47) (0.16)
Dairy Dummy 269.51** 105.94
(2.03) (0.91)
Port Dummy 42.411 1.591
(0.38) (0.01)
Marina Dummy 42.45 280.78* 260.55*
(0.25) (1.81) (1.70)






Intercept 112.84 45139.56 604.70*
(0.23) (1.61) (1.94)







yDependent variable is the privatization price in dollars corrected
for inflation and scaled by 1000.
t-statistics are given in parentheses.
*Significant at the 10% level
**Significant at the 5% level
***Significant at the 1% level
































profits (Regression 2) is significant. Labour productivity,
which is a measure of firm efficiency that can be used in
these regressions due to the homogeneity of output within
the cement industry, is also not significant (Regression 3).
These results imply that differences in efficiency and profit-
ability across public firms within the same industry do not
have significant effects on the sales-adjusted privatization
price. One of the variables that is used to measure profit-
ability, profit margin, exhibits considerably greater varia-
tion in the complete sample than it does in the sample of
cement firms.4
One would argue that profit margins measure the differ-
ences in market power of firms in different industries (mar-
ket structures) rather than differences in firm efficiency and
this is what is reflected in privatization prices in the results
with the aggregate sample.
Differently from the aggregate sample regressions,
the complete privatization dummy has a positive and sig-
nificant effect and capacity utilization ratio has a nega-
tive and significant effect on the privatization price
(Regressions 1 through 6). Thus, one can conclude that
after controlling for firm’s revenues, among firms oper-
ating at similar levels of profitability and efficiency,
unexploited production opportunities and complete private
ownership become the main determinants of privatization
prices.
In Okten and Arin (2002), it is shown that after privati-
zation, recently privatized cement firms lower prices and
increase output, consistent with the argument in this
study that potential buyers would value unexploited pro-
duction opportunities (a low capacity utilization rate) if
they plan to increase output after privatization. It appears
4From Tables 2 and 3, it is observed that the standard deviation of the profit margin is considerably higher for the complete sample.
Table 4B. Determinants of privatization pricesy: cement industry. Dependent variable: privatization price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Proportion 165.40* 167.8** 167.75* 153.82** 159.58** 164.74** 166.01**
Privatized (2.09) (2.08) (1.82) (2.19) (2.12) (2.28) (2.54)
Production 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0009*** 0.0008***
(3.98) (4.01) (2.91) (5.30) (4.81) (4.62) (4.62)
Production 559.02* 580.08* 588.81* 551.26** 571.96** 590.75** 590.97**
Growth rate (1.92) (2.03) (1.81) (2.14) (2.08) (2.67) (2.81)
Cap. Utilization 2.1382 ** 2.14136 ** 1.733
Ratio (2.25) (2.18) (1.41)
Number of 0.046
Workers (0.16)
Restructuring 0.006** 0.005* 0.001
Investment (2.59) (1.91) (0.25)
Number of Bidders 15.95 15.23*
(1.54) (1.73)
The Length of 0.0032
Auction (0.02)
Population 0.9688 1.32 1.41





Intercept 16327.2* 16589.5* 19252.9 19252.9 15964.3** 16586.7** 16704.5**
(2.07) (2.06) (0.87) (0.87) (2.12) (2.32) (2.58)
R-squared 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.79 Na 0.88 0.88
Number of
observations
24 24 24 24 24 18 18
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS
yDependent variable is the privatization price in dollars corrected for inflation and scaled by 1000.
Na R-square is not an appropriate measure of goodness of fit with 2SLS.
t-statistics are given in parentheses
*Significant at the 10% level
**Significant at the 5% level
***Significant at the 1% level
































that the cement industry is transformed from a government
monopoly to a more competitive industry.
The same transition is not likely for other industries
such as ports, and dairy industry and that may be why
one does not find capacity utilization ratio to be significant
in the inter-industry analysis. Government dairy firms faced
considerable competition from the private sector before
privatization. Ports and marinas on the other hand are
more likely to be characterized with a monopolistic market
structure that is likely to continue after privatization.
It is found that government’s restructuring investment
has no significant effects on the sales-adjusted privatization
price (Regression 5). Number of bidders has a positive and
significant effect and the length of the auction is an insig-
nificant determinant of the sales-adjusted privatization
price (Regressions 5 and 6).
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Since generating revenue for government is one of the pri-
mary reasons for privatizing public firms, it is important to
better understand its determinants. Should the government
engage in restructuring policies and investment prior to
privatization? The answer to this question is negative.
Restructuring investment does not increase the sale price.
Firms appear interested in buying a market and hence
market and firm characteristics that affect revenues are
important while current profits and costs are not.
However, government’s decision for complete privatization
is of importance as one finds that firms that are privatized
in total fetch a higher per share price.
Profit margin appears to be a significant and positive
determinant of the sales-adjusted privatization price in
the multi-industry study whereas this variable is not signif-
icant when one focuses on a single (cement) industry. This
is due to the fact that profit margin is a measure of market
power, which varies a great deal when one has firms from
different industries with significantly different market struc-
tures in the sample. In a homogeneous oligopoly like the
cement industry, firms are likely to have similar profit mar-
gins and hence this variable is no longer a significant deter-
minant of the sales-adjusted privatization price.
More empirical studies are needed to analyse whether
the relationship found for the cement industry between
the privatization price and capacity utilization rate holds
for other industries and how it is related to the market
structure of the industry in question. Also needed are stu-
dies that examine how the privatization process variables
and sale prices are related to post-privatization outcomes.
Table 5A. Determinants of privatization pricesy: complete sample. Dependent variable: sales adjusted privatization price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Privatization 0.137 0.160 0.509 1.098
Dummy (0.19) (0.19) (0.46) (0.67)
Profit Margin (Profit 3.336*** 3.107**
Over Sales) (3.04) (2.61)
Cap. Utilization Ratio 0.013
(0.45)
Privatization Year 0.272* 0.249* 0.263 0.110
(1.80) (1.80) (1.67) (0.64)
Profits 0.001
(1.31)
Marina Dummy 28.388*** 24.790*** 21.75*** 20.15***
(9.91) (6.92) (6.33) (5.59)
Port Dummy 4.687 4.484 1.499
(1.21) (1.20) (0.35)
Cement Dummy 1.050 1.866 2.357 4.855
(0.83) (1.19) (1.19) (1.52)
Dairy Dummy  6.428*
(1.94)
Intercept 541.823* 493.791* 521.682 213.708
(1.78) (1.78) (1.65) (0.61)
R-squared 0.94 0.88 0.84 0.80
Number of observations 31 36 36 66
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS
yDependent variable is the privatization price divided by sales and percentage share privatized.
t-statistics are given in parentheses
*Significant at the 10% level
**Significant at the 5% level
***Significant at the 1% level
































After all, if the privatization process is itself flawed, it is
doubtful that the privatized firms will perform better than
state owned enterprises.
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